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NICKY HAGER’S main charge in Other People’s Wars is that 
New Zealand’s defence and foreign 
affairs establishment has developed 
a culture where some senior offic-
ers ‘wanted to obey the government 
only when they agreed with it’, and 
otherwise ‘quietly undermined’ its 
policies and decisions. They be-
lieved they could ‘go to war without 
telling the public most of what they 
did’—and Hager provides convin- 
cing evidence that, for most of the 
last decade, they have been success-
ful.
His sprawling, densely footnoted 
and referenced book is built on a solid 
foundation of thousands of govern-
ment documents, obtained under New 
Zealand’s Official Information Act 
and from confidential sources, and 
copies of diplomatic cables that were 
dispatched from the United States 
Embassy in Wellington and obtained 
by Hager from the Wikileaks’ col-
lection.
Dismiss Hager’s analysis and 
conclusions, if you will, but it is dif-
ficult to dismiss the original source 
material he uses to carve through the 
New Zealand defence mythology that 
has been spin-fed to a trusting public.
Myth 1: The ANZUS fracture
At the end of 1999, Helen Clark 
 PACIFIC JOURNALISM REVIEW 17 (2) 2011  215 
MEDIA, CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND COMMUNITY
led her Labour-Alliance coalition 
government into office, determined 
to avoid any impression that it was 
looking for a revival of the ANZUS 
alliance. She walked into a wall of 
resistance from some of the coun-
try’s most senior defence and foreign 
affairs officials.
A member of Clark’s political 
staff told Hager that ‘every draft com-
ing from defence and foreign affairs 
was worded to reshape the govern-
ment’s new policies, back into the old 
ones’. The issue quickly came to a 
head when the officials delivered their 
draft of the government’s Defence 
Policy Framework early in 2000. 
Clark rewrote it personally. From 
this point on, the New Zealand gov-
ernment would contribute to global 
security and peacekeeping through 
‘participation in the full range of UN 
and other appropriate multilateral 
peace support and humanitarian relief 
operations’.
The Clark Framework did not 
stop the officials’ drift back to the 
old alliance relationship. Hager 
documents the presence of two NZDF 
officers at the start of a week-long 
‘interoperability’ discussion between 
representatives of the armies of 
the United States, Britain, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand at Fort 
Benning, Georgia, on 11 September 
2001. The focus of their discussions: 
preparing the five armies to integrate 
into an effective coalition force dur-
ing conflicts in the 2001 to 2010 
timeframe. ANZUS may have been 
defunct since 1984, but the old mili-
tary alliance club was still operating.
Myth 2: 9/11 provoked the wars
Hager produces testimony from US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell con-
firming that, 24 hours before the 9/11 
attack, White House officials decid-
ed to give the Taliban a final ultima-
tum: hand over Osama Bin Laden 
or they would channel funds to anti-
Taliban forces. If that failed, the US 
would intervene directly and throw 
them out. The next major conflict 
of the new millennium was already 
planned. The only surprise on 9/11 
was that Al Qaeda struck first.
The next day, President Bush 
already had his eye on the next 
target—Iraq. Citing US counter-ter-
rorism co-ordinator Richard Clarke, 
Hager portrays Bush in the White 
House situation room, muttering: ‘See 
if Saddam did this … Look into Iraq, 
Saddam.’ 
Myth 3: NZ’s UN mandate
Helen Clark was flying to Europe 
when the hijacked aircraft hit the 
Twin Towers and the Pentagon. She 
rushed home to confront the first 
pressure test of her Defence Policy 
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Framework. Five days after the 9/11 
attack, her government advised the 
US that ‘if there were a specific role 
for New Zealand special forces, we 
would of course consider it’.
Hager does not try to explain the 
Prime Minister’s sudden transforma-
tion from Helen the Peacemaker to 
Helen the Warrior Princess. She did 
not wait for the formation of the UN 
International Security Assistance 
Force before committing the SAS 
to the war against terrorism. They 
entered as part of US-controlled Op-
eration Enduring Freedom. That, to-
gether with their precise date of entry, 
was concealed at the time under the 
cone of silence that governing politi-
cians and officials are both happy to 
place over SAS operations.
Hager cracks the cone to produce 
the evidence that by the time SAS 
troops set foot in Afghanistan the real 
war-fighting was over and Bin Laden 
had left the country. The Kiwi troops 
found they had ‘no specific role’ to 
play. Step by step, he shows how 
NZDF senior officers proceeded to 
invent one, and sold it to the Ameri-
cans. Through no fault of the troops, 
this new role would soon see the SAS 
demolishing another tenet of the Clark 
Defence Policy Framework.
Myth 4: Protecting human rights
The Clark Defence Policy Frame-
work stated: ‘New Zealand will not 
engage in military cooperation or 
exercises with the armed forces of 
a nation which sanctions the use of 
their armed forces to suppress hu-
man rights.’
It has taken nearly nine years 
of digging by Hager and another 
independent New Zealand free-lance 
journalist, Jon Stephenson, to unearth 
the unsavoury truth about the botched 
raid by an American-Canadian-New 
Zealand joint special operations task-
force on the village of Band e Timur 
in May 2002. Two 70-year-old village 
leaders and a 6-year-old girl died in 
the attack. 55 prisoners were taken, 
transferred to US custody and beaten 
and mistreated. Fifty were released 
without apology or compensation. 
Five are still unaccounted for. The 
New Zealand SAS led the raid, but 
was not equipped to identify the 
prisoners taken and had no ability to 
track their welfare in custody. All this 
was concealed, but is now conceded.
Nine years later, no-one is held 
accountable, and intelligence botch-
ups, civilian deaths, and allegations 
and evidence of the suppression of 
human rights by New Zealand’s allies 
in Afghanistan continue to plague the 
operations of the SAS in and out of 
Kabul.
Myth 5: Saying No on Iraq
When George Bush and Tony Blair 
started conditioning other alliance 
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leaders for the invasion of Iraq in 
April 2002, Helen Clark was quick 
to say no. She was not prepared to be 
involved in an intervention that did 
not have a UN mandate. 
New Zealand Navy frigates and 
RNZAF Orion aircraft were sent to 
the Persian Gulf from November 
2002.Their assigned role was to break 
the Al Qaeda Gulf-Afghanistan sup-
ply line—not to protect the Gulf-Iraq 
invasion supply line. But US control-
lers were running both operations in 
the Gulf and made no such distinction. 
The same problem arose In June 2003, 
when NZDF engineers arrived in Iraq 
to support a UN-mandated recon-
struction effort. They were embedded 
in a British unit that was part of the 
Operation Iraqi Freedom invasion 
force. Hager shows that evidence of 
mission ‘blur’ was gathered by the 
NZDF, but he leaves one crucial ques-
tion unanswered: was it ever drawn to 
the government’s attention? 
Myth 6: Bamiyan reconstruction
Since September 2003, Kiwi Base, 
Bamiyan, has been the centre-piece 
of the NZDF’s campaign to project 
the softer side of its war effort—as 
the model of a successful provincial 
reconstruction team.
Hager shatters some of the illu-
sion by quoting from a previously 
unpublished report on ‘New Zealand 
Official Development Assistance 
supported activities in Afghanistan’, 
dated June 2009. It concludes that 
NZDF was ‘not an effective aid pro-
vider’ and ‘projects overseen by the 
NZDF through the PRT do not ap-
pear to be sustainable in any way and 
anecdotal evidence is that some have 
already failed’. None of the critical 
detail from this report appears in the 
publicly released government review 
of Afghanistan policy, which, never-
theless, recommended ‘civilianisa-
tion’ of New Zealand’s contribution 
to provincial reconstruction. 
The main function of NZDF at 
Kiwi Base has never been reconstruc-
tion, as we use the word. Its main 
role is to operate security patrols, 
gather signals intelligence, and build 
Afghan army and police capacity 
to take over these roles. In military 
operations, NZDF’s Bamiyan deploy-
ment answers to a US commander 
in Bagram. A contingent of Ameri-
can troops shares quarters with the 
Kiwis at the base. Among them, 
under the terms of an official NZ-US 
administrative arrangement document 
that Hager has discovered, can be 
a ‘counter intelligence team at NZ 
PRT Bamian (2-4 pers.)’. This is the 
basis for his claim that New Zealand is 
contributing to the protection and 
support of a CIA base. It is probably 
the most debatable claim in his book.
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Hager casts his net much further 
than this in Other People’s Wars, but 
these six myths have been pivotal in 
shaping the public perception of New 
Zealand’s involvement in the 9/11 
wars. We are only now beginning to 
appreciate the yawning gap between 
the honey-coated vision of UN-driven 
peace-building, mentoring and aid-
focused reconstruction and the blood 
and grit reality of our war-fighting in 
Afghanistan. 
However, the blame for this 
does not rest solely with secretive, 
manipulative officials in defence and 
foreign affairs. It also falls on leading 
politicians of all persuasions and a 
largely complacent mainstream media 
for failing their public duty to foster 
informed debate on policies that con-
sign brave young New Zealanders to 
kill and die in the graveyard of other 
people’s empires.
